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CONTRIBUTIONS TO COLLECTIVELY BARGAINED
PENSION FUNDS REGULATED BY ERISA: THE
EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO ARBITRATION OF
DELINQUENCY CLAIMS
Glen M. Bendixsen*
Disputes between management and unions over allegedly delin-
quent contributions to pension funds generally must be submit-
ted to arbitration under the labor contract which established the
pension plan. A third-party trustee of the pension fund also has
standing under the labor contract and ERISA to enforce the
contract's pension provisions. The author critically examines
Schneider Moving & Storage Company v. Robbins, in which
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the trustee could seek court
interpretation of the particular contract's pension provisions
without exhausting the contract's mandatory arbitration clause.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)1 provides statutory protection for private pension rights
and for suits in court to enforce those rights. An employer's obliga-
tion to maintain a pension plan is often created by a collective
bargaining or other form of agreement which provides for binding
arbitration of all disputes arising under the contract. Pursuant to
that arrangement, a claim about contractual pension rights is an ar-
bitrable dispute. Under national labor and arbitration policy, a party
who has the right to arbitrate a contract claim may be barred from
maintaining a preemptive court suit for judicial resolution of that
0 1987 by Glen M. Bendixsen
* Associate Professor, Business Law & Regulation, School of Business Administration,
Central Michigan University; Labor Arbitrator; B.A., 1956, University of Washington; LL.B.,
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This article presents the author's view that provision in a contract for arbitration of dis-
putes over application and interpretation is a basic term of the parties' bargain. See Bendixsen,
Enforcing the Duty to Arbitrate Claims Arising Under a Collective Bargaining Agreement
Rejected in Bankruptcy: Preserving the Parties' Bargain and National Labor Policy, 8 IN-
Dus. REL. L.J. 401 (1986).
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 898 (1974) (codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-44, and in
scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code).
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claim.
Suits to enforce pension obligations may allege violations of
ERISA and violations of the contract which created the pension
plan. When these mixed-claim suits are brought against an employer
by employees (or by the union on their behalf), they often raise labor
contract disputes subject to mandatory arbitration. In such cases the
lower courts generally grant employer requests to dismiss or to stay
the suit pending arbitration of the contractual claim. The lower
courts are divided, however, when a pension plan trustee charges an
employer with delinquent contributions, and sues under both ERISA
and the pension provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
which requires mandatory arbitration of all contractual disputes.
In Schneider Moving & Storage Company v. Robbins,' the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision
permitting a trustee to maintain a mixed-claim lawsuit for delin-
quent contributions. The Supreme Court's holding rested on the par-
ties' lack of contractual intent to exhaust the grievance and arbitra-
tion provisions of their collective bargaining agreement as a
prerequisite to a trustee's suit to enforce the agreement's pension
provisions. This article does not challenge the Court's ultimate hold-
ing, but is critical of several assumptions on which the holding is
based. In view of that holding the Court refused to determine
whether a trustee would be legally bound by a requirement to ex-
haust arbitration. This article criticizes the Court's failure to decide
that statutory question.
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME: CONVERGENCE OF LABOR AND
PENSION LEGISLATION
A. Collective Bargaining of Pension Plans
An employee benefit plan may provide for various benefits, such
as medical, death, and retirement. These plans ("pension" plans) are
a mutually advantageous method of compensating employees. For
example, contributions may be deductible from employer gross in-
come. Employees may recognize no taxable income until benefits are
paid upon retirement or other termination of employment. Private
pension plans, therefore, are often established independently by the
employer. Because pension plans are a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining, they are often included in bargaining agreements.
A labor contract which includes pension provisions probably
2. 466 U.S. 364 (1984).
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also includes arbitration provisions. Studies have shown that the ma-jority of collective labor agreements contain provisions requiring
binding arbitration of unsettled grievances involving disputes arising
under the agreement.' A "standard" (i.e. broad) grievance/arbitra-
tion provision encompasses all disputes between the employer and
the union or an employee, involving application or interpretation of
the agreement. The more common agreement provides that only the
union may invoke the grievance/arbitration procedures. Many
agreements also give the employer the right to invoke those
procedures."
Only parties who have the right and duty to grieve and arbi-
trate their contractual claims are barred from suing directly in court
on a dispute under a collective bargaining agreement.6 As stated
above, often as a matter of industrial practice, only the union is con-
tractually bound to invoke grievance and arbitration procedures.
This should not suggest an employer propensity to disdain
mandatory arbitration in favor of reserving the courts as a contract
forum. A collective bargaining agreement is predominately a charter
of employment rights secured by the employer's contractual promises
to the employees' bargaining representative. As a result, the typical
contract dispute is one initiated by a union which claims that the
employer took action in violation of a right in the parties' labor con-
tract. The employer typically responds that no such right is
contained in a contract which explicitly or implicitly reserved man-
agement's prerogative to take the challenged action.
This means that under most collective bargaining agreements
the union has both the right to submit most rejected contractual
grievances to binding arbitration, and the duty to forego bringing a
lawsuit based on those arbitrable claims. As a corollary, under most
agreements the employer has the duty to participate in binding arbi-
tration of union contract claims which are arbitrable, and the right
3. A 1979 study indicated that 96% of collective bargaining agreements contain someform of grievance/arbitration provision. Most of those also included no-strike (92%) and no-lockout (87%) provisions. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CON-
TRACTS 15, 78-79 (1979).
4. See 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 99 (2d
ed. 1983).
5. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local50, American Bakery and Confectionary Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
6. The right to grievance arbitration as the exclusive procedure for resolving contractdisputes generally bars employees from bringing suit under the collective bargaining agreement(Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1960)), unless the union arbitrarily refused
to invoke grievance/arbitration procedures in violation of its duty of fair representation (Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967)).
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not to participate in a lawsuit based on those claims." An overview of
national labor and pension legislation shows that these arbitration
principles have equal application to labor-management conflicts in-
volving contractual pension disputes.
B. National Labor Policy of Encouraging Compliance with Agree-
ments to Arbitrate All Contractual Disputes, Including Pension
Disputes
The inaccessibility, in most instances, of the courts to contract
disputants in a collective bargaining relationship flows from
entrenched national labor policies defined by the United States Su-
preme Court in the Lincoln Mills case in 1957 and in the Steelwork-
ers Trilogy of cases in 1960.
1. Lincoln Mills
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,8 the Court con-
strued a key provision of the Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act) of 1947 (LMRA)' which amended the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).10 Section 301 of the LMRA vests
jurisdiction in federal courts over suits for violation of contracts be-
tween a union and an employer in industries affecting commerce."
The Court held in Lincoln Mills that this section authorizes the fed-
eral courts to distill from the federal labor laws a body of federal
labor-contract law, including arbitration law. Thus, the Court held
that under federal labor laws and policy, a promise to arbitrate dis-
putes in a labor contract is specifically enforceable." This construc-
tion of section 301 was necessary, the Court determined, to give ef-
fect to Congress' intention to provide for peaceful resolution of
disputes arising during the term of the labor contract, "since plainly
the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for
an agreement not to strike." 8
7. When the agreement allows the employer as well to invoke grievance/arbitration pro-
cedures, the union/employer rights and duties described above apply to both parties, and thus
the employer also is precluded from bringing a lawsuit on the arbitrable claim.
8. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1982).
10. Id. at §§ 151-97.
11. Id. at § 185(a).
12. The Court subsequently held thai although section 301 left the state courts with
concurrent jurisdiction to enforce labor contracts, they must apply principles of federal law
developed under the Lincoln Mills case. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502
(1962); Local 174 Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
13. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455.
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With this exchange, it is assumed that the union will be en-
couraged to relinquish the strike if it knows in advance that employ-
ers can be held to their promise to resolve contract disputes through
arbitration. An employer's promise to arbitrate labor contract claims
is obviously valuable to both employee and public interests. Accord-
ingly, a collective bargaining agreement containing that promise but
lacking a no-strike provision is deemed to include an implied union/
employee obligation not to strike if the claim is arbitrable."' The
lockout is the counterpart of the strike. Therefore, a contractual
commitment to make arbitration the final step in the grievance
procedure may also prohibit an employer from locking out over arbi-
trable disputes."5
2. The Steelworkers Trilogy
In the Steelworkers Trilogy," the Supreme Court elevated the
role of labor arbitration. The Court announced a national policy ofjudicial self-restraint when the parties have mutually selected an ar-
bitrator to resolve their contractual disputes. The three decisions
established ground rules to guide courts which are called upon to
enforce a mandatory arbitration commitment in a labor contract, or
to enforce a labor arbitration award.
The decisions held that the declaration in section 203(d) of the
LMRA is evidence of congressional intent to create a national policy
favoring arbitration. That section states that "[flinal adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desir-
able method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining
agreement. 
. . . -17 A court called upon to compel arbitration should
eschew any temptation, in the guise of pretermitting frivolous
reliance on the contract, to decide the substantive merit of the con-
tractual grievance. The court's province is to determine whether,
under the parties' contract, there is a mandatory duty to arbitrate the
particular claim. If the duty exists and the claim is arbitrable, the
merit of the claim is for the arbitrator to decide. For, "it was his
14. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at 104-06.
15. Pan American Airways, Inc., 5 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 590, 594-95 (1946). Cf General
Electric Co., 54 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 660, 673 (1969).
16. The Steelworkers Trilogy consists of: United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574(1960); and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
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judgment and all that it connotes that was bargained for."18
Secondly, section 301 and national labor policy require that la-
bor contracts be construed in a manner most hospitable to
arbitration. The Supreme Court held that a standard and mandatory
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement creates a pre-
sumption of arbitrability. In labor arbitration "[an order to arbitrate
the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said
with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible
of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should
be resolved in favor of coverage." 1 More than an ordinary contract,
a labor contract is a working arrangement between labor and man-
agement encompassing implicit understandings and plant practices.
It is this feature of a labor contract that informs the parties' selection
of a labor arbitrator possessing specialized knowledge and experience
which "[tihe ablest judge cannot be expected to bring ... .
Finally, the Court held that the national labor policy,
established by Congress in section 301 and other Taft-Hartley
amendments, favors judicial deference to the determinations of an ar-
bitrator selected by the parties. The court should not undertake a
merits review of the award to determine its correctness. Judicial in-
quiry should be limited to a determination of whether the arbitrator
exceeded the authority granted by the parties' agreement. Under this
constraint the court should sustain the award as long as "it draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
'112
3. The Taft-Hartley Regulation of Pensions
The Taft-Hartley amendments include a provision which im-
poses some regulation on pension plans resulting from collective
bargaining. The provision does not cover a bargained plan which
provides for unilateral administration by employer representatives or
an independent trustee. These plans generally impose no obligations
on the union beyond those flowing from its duties as the employees'
exclusive bargaining representative, such as the duty of fair repre-
sentation of all unit employees. Rather, section 302(c)(5) of the
18. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68.
19. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578-79.
20. Id. at 582.
21. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597. The Supreme Court has contin-
ued to reaffirm the vitality of the principles established in the Steelworkers Trilogy, described
supra. See Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 469 U.S. 815 (1985); AT&T Technologies Inc. v.
Communications Workers of America, 106 S. Ct. 1415, 1419 (1986).
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LMRA,22 addresses pension plans which are jointly administered by
the employer and the union. These "Taft-Hartley" plans provide for
employer and union representation on a board of trustees, obligating
the union trustees to act primarily in the interests of the plan. 8 Af-
ter enactment of section 302(c)(5), however, the parties remain free
to negotiate a unilaterally administered plan outside of that section's
constraints. 4 Either form of plan may be contained within the par-
ties' collective bargaining agreement, or incorporated within the
agreement by reference to a plan embodied in separate documents.
Thus, a labor agreement may directly, or indirectly by incorpo-
ration, provide for binding grievance arbitration of disputes over
application and interpretation of the agreement, including its pension
plan provisions. Where the parties have agreed on a Taft-Hartley
plan, however, section 302(c)(5) imposes a unique form of statutory
arbitration. That section requires arbitration by an impartial umpire
of any plan administration decision on which the union-employer
trustees are deadlocked.
4. Pension Dispute Resolution Prior to Enactment of ERISA
Prior to enactment of ERISA, the courts generally applied
Steelworkers Trilogy to encourage Taft-Hartley deadlock arbitration
and deference to awards of the impartial umpires.25 ERISA's elabo-
rate statutory requirements, described below, have put in question
the propriety of enforcing deadlock arbitration in all circumstances.
One reason for this is the Department of Labor's (DOL's) regula-
tions limiting the use of deadlock arbitration. The DOL's position is
that arbitrators who resolve some categories of pension plan disputes
are fiduciaries, in certain circumstances, for the purposes of ERISA.
The extent to which ERISA limits deadlock arbitration has not been
definitively resolved.2"
22. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982).
23. These jointly administered plans involve monies paid to the union as trustee and,
accordingly, were statutorily created to exempt union-management plan administration from
the statutory proscription of employer payments to union officials. (LMRA § 302(a)-(b), 29U.S.C. § 186(a)-(b) (1982)). See Arroyo v. U.S., 359 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1959). Only pensionplans satisfying the requirements of section 302(c)(5) may benefit from this exemption. Parties
not desiring a jointly administered pension plan may still negotiate a plan to be unilaterally
administered.
24. See supra note 23.
25. See Schneider, Surviving ERISA Preemption: Pension Arbitration in the 1980's,
16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 269, 311 n.226 (1980) [hereinafter Surviving ERISA].
26. See generally Dobranski, The Arbitrator as a Fiduciary Under the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974: A Misguided Approach, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 65 (1982);
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The focus here is on ERISA's impact on grievance arbitration
to resolve disputes under collectively bargained pension plans. As
stated above, a bargained plan may be either a jointly administered
Taft-Hartley plan or a unilaterally administered plan. In either case
the bargaining agreement may provide for mandatory grievance arbi-
tration of pension disputes arising under the agreement. Before
passage of ERISA, arbitrators and the courts treated arbitrable pen-
sion disputes like other controversies arising under collective bar-
gaining agreements. After an "examination of pre-ERISA judicial
and arbitration decisions on pension dispute arbitrability," one com-
mentator concluded that "[a]ll disputes . . .(at least in the years
following the Steelworkers Trilogy decisions) were subject to binding
arbitration unless such disputes were found to be explicitly exempt
from contractual arbitration coverage. ''1 Even where the parties'
agreement did not appear to contemplate grievance arbitration of
pension disputes, "[a]rbitrability was generAlly upheld if the pension
claim was found to affect a contractually based guarantee or to de-
rive from a pension plan mentioned in the contract." 8 The pension
disputes arbitrated could involve matters of funding, vesting, eligibil-
ity, payments of benefits, or investment of plan assets. These disputes
could also involve related matters pertaining to the administration of
a plan or disposition of a plan's assets.
29
Accordingly, prior to ERISA the federal and state courts gener-
ally dismissed or stayed employee or union contractual pension suits
if the complainant had not exhausted the contract's mandatory griev-
ance arbitration provisions, or if a final award had been rendered.
30
The contract was the basis of the pension right claimed. It was,
therefore, "proper to require compliance with the predetermined
grievance provisions for settlement of disputes arising under the con-
tract and to hold the complaining party bound by the remedy that
was negotiated under the contract.""1
Scheinholtz & Miscimarra, The Arbitrator as Judge and Jury: Another Look at Statutory
Law in Arbitration, 40 ARB. J. 55, 64-66 (1985).
27. Surviving ERISA, supra note 25, at 276-77.
28. Id. at 277-78.
29. Id.
30. See generally Donaldson, The Use of Arbitration to Avoid Litigation Under ERISA,
17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 215, 219-20 (1975).
31. Id. at 220. Of course, where the collective bargaining agreement does not mandate
arbitration of disputes arising from the agreement's pension provisions, the union may bring a
contract suit under section 301 to enforce those provisions. In some circumstances an employee
as well may sue on the contract under that section, since that section authorizes employee suits
when a collective bargaining agreement creates substantive rights directly enforceable by indi-
vidual employees. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
[Vol. 27
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It was settled law that a third-party trustee of a collectively-
bargained pension plan may have standing to bring suit against an
employer to enforce the labor contract's pension provisions as a non-
signatory third party beneficiary.32 Far from settled, however, was
the seldom raised question of whether a direct section 301 trustee's
suit was barred when the contract called for mandatory arbitration
of all contractual disputes. Some lower courts held that the trustee
was not bound by the arbitration clause absent an indication in the
contract that the clause was applicable to the trustee as well. A con-
trary view held that an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining
agreement applies to a third party beneficiary, such as a pension
plan trustee, unless the agreement indicates an intent to exclude the
third party from the duty to arbitrate."3
C. ERISA's Complementary Arbitration Policies
The various pension matters which could be the subject of pri-
vate contract, and hence trigger arbitrable contract disputes, also
became matters of statutory requirement in 1974, under ERISA.
That statute provides minimum standards for reporting and disclo-
sure,3 4 participation and vesting," funding,3 6 and fiduciary responsi-
bility in developing and operating pension plans. 7
1. Federal Court Jurisdiction Under ERISA
Even more pertinent here, ERISA section 502"8 confers juris-
diction in the federal courts to enforce both the standards required
by ERISA and the terms of pension plans covered by ERISA, in-
32. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960); Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers
Local 12 v. A-I Elec. Serv., 535 F.2d 1, 4 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1974);
Local 688 Int'l Bhd. Teamsters v. Mizerany Warehouses, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Mo.
1976); Trustees of Atlanta Iron Workers Local 387 Pension Fund v. Southern Stress Wire
Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Ga. 1981); 48 AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations§ 329 (1985); 48A AM. JuR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations § 1945 (1985).
33. Owen v. One-Stop Food & Liquor Store, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. IIl. 1973);Wishnick v. One-Stop Food & Liquor Store, 359 F. Supp. 239 (N.D. 11. 1973); Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers Local 308 v. Dave's Elec. Serv. Inc., 382 F. Supp. 427 (M.D. Fla. 1974),
remanded on unrelated grounds, 545 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1977); 5 Am. JUR. 21 Rights ofThird Parties § 22 (1985). See also Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923,
938 (3d Cir. 1985).
34. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) §§ 101-11, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1021-31 (1982).
35. Id. at §§ 201-11, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-61.
36. Id. at §§ 301-06, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-86.
37. Id. at §§ 401-14, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-14.
38. Id. at § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).
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cluding collectively bargained plans. Civil actions under section 502
may be brought in federal court by either the Secretary of Labor, a
participant (employee covered by the plan), a beneficiary (person
designated to receive a plan benefit), a fiduciary (e.g., an administra-
tor, officer, trustee, or custodian of the plan), or by a plan as an
entity. Moreover, participants and beneficiaries may bring a contract
suit in federal or state court to enforce their rights under the terms
of a plan. However, if a participant or beneficiary asserts both a
statutory right to pension benefits under ERISA and a right to bene-
fits under a collective bargaining agreement, section 502 requires the
suit be brought in federal court.39
Several features of section 502 are noteworthy. The lower
courts have held that a union is not authorized to bring a section 502
suit in its own interest to enforce employee pension rights under
ERISA or a contractual pension plan.40 However, when the plan is
part of a collective bargaining agreement, the union still may sue the
employer under LMRA section 301 in federal or state court to en-
force the agreement's pension provision.41 Nor does ERISA section
502 affect the section 301 authorization of employee contract suits in
federal or state court when the collective bargaining agreement cre-
ates substantive pension rights directly enforceable by individual
employees. 42 Hence, as to collectively-bargained pension plans, sec-
tion 301 and section 502 overlap with regard to suits by employees
to enforce pension rights under a labor contract. 43 Likewise, section
502 does not affect the standing which section 301 accords trustees of
bargained pension plans to sue an employer for enforcement of con-
tractual pension rights." Thus, sections 301 and 502 also overlap
here, since the latter provides jurisdiction for a plan fiduciary's suit
to enforce the pension provisions of a labor agreement."
39. Id. at § 502(a)(l)(B), (e), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (e).
40. See Utility Workers Union v. Consumers Power Co., 453 F. Supp. 447, 450 (E.D.
Mich. 1978), affd, 637 F.2d 1082 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds without opinion, 451
U.S. 1014 (1981); Pressroom Unions-Printing League Income Sec. Fund v. Continental Assur.
Co., 700 F.2d 889 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 148 (1983); District 65, UAW v. Harper
& Row, Publisher, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1468, 1476 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
41. See supra note 31.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Leonardis v. Local 282 Pension Trust Fund, 391 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); Hood v. Prudential Ins. Co., 460 So. 2d 1227 (Ala. 1984).
44. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
45. Laborers Fringe Benefit Funds - Detroit & Vicinity v. Northwest Concrete & Con-
str. Inc., 640 F.2d 1350 (6th Cir. 1981); Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund. v. Kaufman
& Broad, 707 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1983); Int'l Union of Bricklayers v. Menard & Co., 619 F.
Supp. 1457, 1463 (D.R.I. 1985).
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In light of the above, ERISA section 502 authorizes various
parties to invoke the courts' jurisdiction to enforce pension plan
terms and to obtain relief for denial of benefits or breach of fiduciary
responsibility. ERISA broadly defines a fiduciary as any person who
exercises discretionary authority or control of the management, ad-
ministration, or assets of a pension plan. The standards for fiduciary
responsibility are multi-faceted. They include administering the plan
"in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with
the provision of [ERISA]. ' " Under section 410(a), any delegation of
a fiduciary responsibility is expressly voided. 47 As a result of these
provisions, claims concerning plan administration, possibly including
even benefit denial claims which previously were only contractual
claims, may now be considered a breach of fiduciary responsibility.
Arguably, use of an arbitrator to resolve such claims is inconsistent
with section 410(a), particularly in view of ERISA's declared policy
"to protect . . . the interests of participants . . .by providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the federal
courts." 8
2. Judicial Deference to Pension Arbitration
A benefit denial suit filed by an employee or union may invoke
ERISA, but clearly must be based on the contractual terms of a
pension plan which requires exhaustion of the plan's internal proce-
dures, including arbitration. Since ERISA, the courts generally have
dismissed such suits pursuant to the national labor policy requiring
exhaustion of contractual arbitral remedies. As one court has stated:
Congressional intent as to what procedure must be fol-
lowed by a claimant before he may maintain a suit in a court of
law was made evident . . . [in the legislative history] ...
where it is stated that all suits by the employee to recover bene-
fits under ERISA must follow the same procedures as actions
brought under [section] 301 . ..of the [LMRA].
According to Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, before an
employee can assert his rights under LMRA [section] 301 in
court, he must follow the administrative procedures outlined in
the contract. Thus, a claimant under ERISA must exhaust his
administrative procedures, as is required under LMRA [section]
46. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (1982).
47. Id. at § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109, 1110(a).
48. Id. at § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
1987]
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301, according to the intent of Congress."
The preservation of this national labor policy becomes more in-
volved when a suit is based both on denial of a right under the
contract's pension provisions, and on a fiduciary breach of a right
protected under ERISA. In some instances, the courts have ex-
amined such "mixed-claims" to determine whether they are based
primarily on a violation of fiduciary duty, or a violation of the con-
tract. If the latter, the court may dismiss the suit for failure to ex-
haust grievance arbitration procedures.50 On the other hand, where
both arbitrable contract pension claims and violation of ERISA
rights are alleged, some courts have stayed the suit involving statu-
tory issues until arbitration of the contract benefit claim is
completed.' 1
As the above suggests, the course which the courts will follow is
not sharply defined. After ERISA's enactment, the early commentary
generally urged that pension benefit claims disputes remained subject
to mandatory arbitration under collective bargaining agreements,
with statutory pension issues reserved to the courts. 2 The rejection
of a provision in the Senate version of ERISA was, in effect, a
congressional reaffirmance of contractually mandated arbitration of
pension claims. The Senate version would have required pension
plans to provide for optional (but not mandatory) arbitration proce-
dures for benefit claims." Omission of this provision ensured that
judicial deference to arbitration would not be precluded. As indicated
above, the Conference Report voiced a congressional intent to adhere
to the national labor policy of exhausting mandatory grievance arbi-
tration as developed in litigation under LMRA section 301."'
Six years after ERISA was passed, one commentator concluded
49. Scheider v. United States Steel Corp., 486 F. Supp. 211, 213 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(citations omitted). The Conference Committee suggested that ERISA benefit claims are to be
litigated in the same manner as claims arising under section 301. See H.R. REP. No. 128D,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5107. Accord
Adams v. Gould, Inc., 687 F.2d 27, 31 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085 (1983);
Delaney v. Union Carbide Corp., 749 F.2d 17 (8th Cir. 1984); United Steelworkers v. Canron
Inc., 580 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir. 1978). See also Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d
1219 (1lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 863 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
50. Challenger v. Local 1, Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, 619 F.2d
645 (7th Cir. 1980); Delaney, 749 F.2d at 19.
51. Airline Pilots Ass'n v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 627 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Viggiano v. Shenango China Div. of Anchor Hocking, 750 F.2d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 1984).
52. See generally Donaldson, supra note 30.
53. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4833, 4870.
54. See supra note 49.
[Vol. 27
1987]
there was a growing judicial recognition that ERISA preserved the
rule of arbitrating pension benefit claims when mandated by either a
collective bargaining contract or the parties' supplemental plan
agreement, while reserving statutory pension issues to the courts."' A
more recent commentator concluded that:
[A] review of cases is clearly not dispositive of how the courts
will treat pension arbitrability issues involving benefit or fiduci-
ary claims. . . . [Tihe net effect at present appears to be that
the court will continue to defer to arbitration all pension issues
except those involving independent statutory claims of breach of
fiduciary responsibility. .... 56
A description of the statutory regime bearing on arbitration of
pension plan disputes would not be complete without inclusion of the
amendments to ERISA enacted in the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA). 57 The amendments address
pension plans which are funded by more than one employer pursu-
ant to a collective bargaining agreement. MPPAA was designed, in
part, to financially strengthen multiemployer pension plans by dis-
couraging employers from withdrawing and leaving a plan with
unfunded liabilities. Where withdrawal nevertheless occurs, MP-
PAA requires payments generally related to the liability left behind
by imposing, where appropriate, a withdrawal liability calculated by
the plan's trustees.
If the withdrawal liability is disputed and cannot be settled, the
dispute must be arbitrated.5 In that proceeding, the arbitrator must
accord certain rebuttable presumptions to the trustees' calculations.
The arbitrator's award may be challenged in a federal district court,
but its factual findings and conclusions are presumed correct unless
shown erroneous by a clear preponderance of the evidence.5 This is
a narrow judicial review. It appears, however, to permit greater judi-
cial scrutiny than may be given conventional labor arbitration
awards under the Steelworkers Trilogy, where awards do not reflect
such statutory tipping of the arbitrator's scales. Nevertheless, the
55. Surviving ERISA, supra note 25, at 296-326.
56. Gilman & Gilman, The Arbitration of Pension Disputes Involving ERISA and
MPPAA 184, 188, Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Conference, Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution (SPIDR), San Francisco, California, 1984. See also Civil Actions Under
ERISA Section 502(a): When Should Courts Require that Claimants Exhaust Arbitral or
Intrafund Remedies?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 952 (1986).
57. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980 § 4221, Pub. L. No. 96-364,
94 Stat. 1208, 1239, 29 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (1982).
59. Id. at § 1401(a)(3), (b)(2), (c).
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constitutionality of the limited judicial review of withdrawal liability
awards provided by MPPAA is an unresolved issue.6" Moreover,
when a withdrawal liability dispute is anchored in statutory issues,
some lower courts have held that arbitration is not necessary prior to
initiation of a MPPAA lawsuit, because any legal issues resolved by
an arbitrator would be reviewed de novo if challenged.6"
The above issues raised by MPPAA go beyond the scope of this
article. It will be suggested, however, that MPPAA's inclusion of
statutory arbitration of withdrawal liability evidences a congressional
approval of arbitration of pension plan disputes ignored by the Su-
preme Court in Schneider.
III. POsT-ERISA SUITS BY TRUSTEES AGAINST AN EMPLOYER
FOR DELINQUENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO A PENSION FUND
A. Conflicting Views Whether Exhaustion of Compulsory Arbitra-
tion Provisions Is Required
Apart from claims that pension benefits are being improperly
denied, another common claim is that an employer has defaulted on
a contractual obligation to contribute to a pension fund. Delinquent
contributions may cause underfunding and threaten the integrity of
the trust fund established by a pension plan. When the delinquency
occurs in a collectively-bargained pension plan, contractual remedies
against the employer under LMRA section 301 are available to the
employees and the union. Contractual remedies under section 301
are available to a third-party trustee as well.62 ERISA added to the
trustee's collection rights by providing in section 502 for trustee suits
to enforce the terms of a plan.63 Moreover, ERISA's broad fiduciary
standards obligate the independent trustee to monitor contributions
and to seek collection of them.
This trustee responsibility is critical primarily when a plan is a
multiemployer plan funded by many companies. Typically, an em-
ployer becomes a contributor through a collective bargaining contract
which refers to and incorporates the trust agreements under which
the multiemployer plan operates. A claim that the employer is delin-
60. Gilman and Gilman, supra note 56, at 197-203; Fulton & Sons v. New England
Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, Inc., 762 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1986); United
Retail & Wholesale Employee Teamsters Union Local 115 v. Yahn & McDonald, Inc., 787
F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986), appeal granted, Nos. 86-231, 253, 55 U.S.L.W. 3391 (1986).
61. I.A.M. National Pension Fund Benefit Plan C v. Stockton TRI Indus., 727 F.2d
1204 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Scheinholtz and Miscimarra, supra note 26, at 66.
62. See supra note 32.
63. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1982).
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quent in payments is, therefore, usually a dispute arising under the
labor contract. When the contract provides for binding arbitration of
all contractual disputes, the question is whether or not arbitration is
a prerequisite to suing the employer for collection of alleged delin-
quent contributions on behalf of the plan. ERISA has not altered the
duty of employees and unions to exhaust those arbitral remedies. 6'
When the trustee brings a collection suit, however, the question
of exhausting arbitration procedures takes on different dimensions.
Often the trust agreements expressly authorize the trustee to initiate
appropriate legal action for collection. Moreover, prior to ERISA
the few lower court decisions had taken conflicting views on whether
a nonsignatory trustee to the collective bargaining agreement was,
even though a third-party beneficiary, bound by the agreement's
mandatory arbitration provisions." The enactment of MPPAA
added another dimension by specifying that an "employer who is
obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the
terms of the plan or under the terms of the collectively bargained
agreement shall . . .make such contributions. ... "66 Arguably,
this makes a trustee's suit for delinquent contributions both a statu-
tory and a contract claim.
The federal appellate courts, after enactment of ERISA, did not
definitively examine the question of arbitration in trustee suits for
delinquent contributions until four years prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Schneider. In the respective suits against employ-
ers by trustees seeking collection and other relief, the federal courts'
jurisdiction was invoked under LMRA section 301 and ERISA sec-
tion 502. In each suit, the employers' defenses were essentially the
same. They argued that the alleged delinquencies reflected union-
management disputes as to the meaning of the collective bargaining
agreement concerning, for example, the plan's coverage of some em-
ployee groups. The merit of the trustees' collection claims thus
turned on an interpretation of the contract, which the employers as-
serted is a matter for the arbitrator and not the court, under national
labor policy. The employers' position was first accepted by the Sev-
enth Circuit, and the Fourth Circuit followed that lead.67
The employers' position was initially also accepted by three-
64. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 33 and 45.
66. .29 U.S.C. § 1145 (1982).
67. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Howard Martin, Inc., 625 F.2d
171 (7th Cir. 1980); Trustees of Nat'l Benefit Fund for Hosp. & Health Care Employees v.
Constant Care Community Health Center, Inc., 669 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1982).
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judge panels of the Eighth Circuit. Then, in a change of views, the
Eighth Circuit rejected the employers' position in a divided en banc
decision by the entire court in the Schneider case which the Supreme
Court affirmed on appeal. 8 The Eighth Circuit in Schneider held
that a trustee could directly sue the employer under ERISA section
502 for delinquent contributions, even though the delinquency de-
pended on interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement which
required the parties to arbitrate contractual disputes. That view was
followed by the Fifth and, later, the Third Circuits.69
The Supreme Court's determination to take review in Schnei-
der presumably would resolve a statutory question to which the
lower courts had given conflicting answers. Lower court decisions
had attempted to reconcile the terms and spirit of ERISA with a
strong national labor policy of faithful adherence to union-manage-
ment agreements in arbitrating disputes over the interpretation and
application of collective bargaining agreements. The attempted rec-
onciliation included the lower courts' examination of principles
established by the Supreme Court in analogous contexts. In Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver and other cases, 0 the Court has rejected em-
ployer assertions that judicial resolution of an employee's statutory
claim improperly requires the court to resolve a labor contract dis-
68. Robbins v. Schneider Moving and Storage Co., 700 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. en banc
1983), aff d, 466 U.S. 364 (1984).
69. Bugher v. Consol. X-Ray Service Corp., 705 F.2d 1426 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 3524 (1985); Trustee of Local 478 Trucking and Allied Indus. Pension Fund
v. Siemens Corp., 721 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1983).
70. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The referenced Supreme Court
cases involved employee claims against employers grounded both in collective bargaining con-
tracts and in individual rights conferred by statutory or constitutional provisions. Thus, in
Gardner-Denver, the Court held that a union/employee obligation to arbitrate a claim that
the employer violated an anti-discrimination provision in the parties' labor agreement did not
bar the employee from bringing suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Indeed,
the actual holding was that the employee could go to court under Title VII for a de novo
determination of his discrimination claim, even though contractual arbitration had been con-
ducted and had resulted in an adverse award which dismissed the claim. The Court later held
that, under Gardner-Denver, the same was true of an employee wage claim filed in court and
based on the Fair Labor Standards Act, even though the claim was subject to mandatory
arbitration under the wage provisions of the parties' labor contract (Barrentine v. Arkansas
Freight Systems, 450 U.S. 728 (1981)); and, also true of an employee claim in court that his
discharge by a public employer abridged his constitutional rights of free speech and association
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even though the issue of just cause for discharge was subject
to mandatory arbitration under the parties' labor contract (McDonald v. City of West Branch
Michigan, 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984)). The lower courts have applied or not applied Gardner-
Denver in various circumstances where there was an overlap of arbitrable contractual rights
and individual statutory rights. See Fowler, Arbitration, the Trilogy, and Individual Rights:
Development Since Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 36 LAa. L.J. 173, 180-81 (1985);
Scheinholtz and Miscimarra, supra note 26, at 62-63.
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pute which the employer is contractually entitled to resolve in griev-
ance arbitration.
In Schneider, for example, the Eighth Circuit's holding rested
in part on Gardner-Denver and related Supreme Court decisions
which, said the Eighth Circuit, "reemphasized that certain statutory
labor rights . . . are not subject to waiver under a grievance-arbitra-
tion clause. '71 Moreover, the Eighth Circuit found support for its
holding in the Supreme Court decision in Lewis v. Benedict Coal
Corp."" In Lewis the trustee sued under the collective bargaining
agreement for delinquent contributions. The employer's defense
relied on the union's own breach of the agreement. The employer
asserted that under established principles of contract law, a third-
party beneficiary (the trustee) was subject to the defenses which the
promisor (the employer) could invoke if sued by the promisee (the
union). The Eighth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court rejected
that argument in Lewis on the ground that a collective bargaining
agreement is not a typical third-party beneficiary contract.7 By con-
trast, Lewis was distinguished by federal courts which held that the
trustee was subject to collectively bargained arbitration obligations.
In the view of those courts, Lewis held only that a trustee is not
subject to the employer's substantive defenses against the union when
those defenses defeat the rights of beneficiaries. "Requiring arbitra-
tion . . . will not subvert any rights. It will merely change the initial
forum to the preferred forum as a matter of national labor policy
and the selected forum by the terms of the agreement itself."'7 '
There was, therefore, a well-defined conflict among the federal
courts which the Supreme Court in Schneider was called upon to
resolve.
71. 700 F.2d at 441 (citing Gardner-Denver and Barrentine); see supra note 70.
72. 361 U.S. 459 (1960). See also Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72 (1982).
73. 700 F.2d at 436-37, 439. The Eighth Circuit also relied on NLRB v. Amax Coal
Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981), where the union called a strike to force the employer to continue
contributing to a multiemployer trust fund and to abandon a decision to establish a plan man-
aged by trustees selected by the employer. The employer charged that this was an unfair labor
practice by the union on the theory that trustees selected by an employer are collective bargain-
ing representatives and the union was improperly coercing the employer in its selection of
those representatives. The Supreme Court rejected this theory, emphasizing the independence
of a trustee and a trustee's primary obligation to plan beneficiaries, and the separateness of a
pension fund from both the union and the employer.
74. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union No. 308 v. Dave's Elec. Serv., Inc., 382 F.
Supp. at 432, 433.
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B. Schneider and the Unresolved Conflict
The Supreme Court held that exhaustion of the contracting
parties' arbitration procedures is not a prerequisite to a trustee suit
for delinquent contributions. In contrast to the lower courts, the Su-
preme Court in Schneider gave scant consideration to reconciling
ERISA and national labor and arbitration policies. Furthermore, the
Court ignored the parties' conflicting arguments over the applicabil-
ity of the Court's prior decisions, in Gardner-Denver and its
progeny, which permit judicial resolution of a statutory claim even
though the underlying dispute is also an arbitrable contractual
claim. 5 Instead, the Court made an analysis which is both truncated
and simplistic.
Justice Powell's unanimous opinion curtailed the Court's in-
quiry at the outset by construing the Eighth Circuit's decision as
based exclusively on "a narrow question of contract interpreta-
tion. '' 7 According to Justice Powell:
The en banc court considered only whether the parties to the
collective bargaining agreements and the trust agreements in-
tended to require the arbitration of disputes between the
trustees and the employer before the trustees could exercise
their contractual right to sue in federal court. Because of its res-
olution, the Court of Appeals did not reach respondent's argu-
ment that requiring the trustees to submit their disputes with
the employer to the applicable arbitration procedure was pro-
hibited as a matter of law [i.e., national pension policy]. If we
agree with the Court of Appeals that the parties did not provide
for such an arrangement, we also need not address that
argument. 77
The Supreme Court's analysis of the parties' trust and collective
bargaining agreements led to the conclusion that the parties did not
intend to make the exhaustion of mandatory arbitration provisions a
condition of the trustee's contractual right to seek judicial enforce-
ment of the pension provisions. Because of this conclusion, the Court
held that it had "no occasion to determine . . .[the] legality" of an
exhaustion requirement.7
8
The Court's interpretation of the parties' agreement was proba-
bly inevitable in light of a threshold determination by Justice Powell
75. See supra note 70.
76. 104 S. Ct. at 1847.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1847, 1851 n.23.
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which dealt the employers' case a crippling blow. Justice Powell
held that the presumption of arbitrability established by the Steel-
workers Trilogy is not applicable to disputes between the employer
and pension fund trustees "even if those disputes raise questions of
interpretation under the collective bargaining agreements." 79 The
succinct predicate given for this holding is that the function of labor
arbitration is to displace strikes and lockouts. Since trustees have no
recourse to these weapons, "requiring them to arbitrate disputes
with the employer would promote labor peace only indirectly, if at
all." 8
Once the Court held that the labor presumption of arbitrability
did not apply, it took only three short steps to find that the labor
agreements had "no intent . . . to require arbitration of disputes be-
tween the trustees and the employers."'"
First, the pension agreements specified that the trustees had
authority to initiate any legal proceeding to collect delinquent contri-
butions. This authority was unconditional. Moreover, the Court
noted, the grievance/arbitration provisions in the parties' agreements
referred only to disputes between signatories, i.e., between the em-
ployers and the union and employees.
Secondly, the Court reasoned, this intent to limit access to the
arbitral process to signatories is not overridden by the third-party
beneficiary rule. That rule would subject the trustees to the exhaus-
tion-of-arbitration defense to the same extent that the union would
be subject to the defense, had it gone to court alleging delinquent
contributions. The rule is not applicable if it would defeat the intent
of the contracting parties, and, the Court added, under Lewis a
"mechanical application of the rule" is improper with regard to "the
trust beneficiaries of collective bargaining agreement."82
Thirdly, in the absence of provisions authorizing the trustee to
invoke the arbitration process, the trustee may have to rely on the
union to arbitrate the pension dispute with the employer. That, the
Court stated, was implausible. The trustee and a reluctant union
may have conflicting views on the pension agreement provisions
79. Id. at 1849.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1849 n.l 1. Justice Powell's emphasis on limiting application of an arbitration
clause to contract signatories fails to mention the Court's past holdings where such clauses
have been applied to nonsignatories. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543
(1964) (successor corporation); Republic Steel Co. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965) (individual
employee). See also Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 939 (3d Cir.
1985).
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which the trustee seeks to enforce. The Court rejected the argument
that the union would be constrained by its duty of fair representa-
tion. That duty is owed to employees in the bargaining unit. There
"is simply no evidence that the Union owes any statutory or contrac-
tual duty of fair representation to the trustees."83
The impact of Schneider seems fairly predictable. It impliedly
but tentatively establishes that a third-party trustee of a collectively-
bargained pension plan may be bound by the parties' arbitration
agreement when that agreement expressly applies to the trustee.
Otherwise, Schneider definitively establishes the trustee is not bound
by the arbitration requirement. In that event, the trustee may seek
judicial interpretation and direct enforcement of the parties' pension
plan agreement. A judicial remedy, however, is not available to the
parties, because they are contractually committed to having an arbi-
trator interpret the pension agreement.
The Court stated that there was no need in Schneider to deter-
mine the legality of an arbitration provision which expressly covers a
contractual pension issue raised by a trustee. That statement necessi-
tates treating as tentative, and therefore as dictum, the Court's
implied holding that the provision is binding on the trustee. The un-
certainty of enforceability which Schneider creates is surely unset-
tling to employers who have successfully negotiated arbitration pro-
visions covering pension claims by a trustee,84 or who contemplate
negotiating that arbitration requirement.
Even more unsettling is the starting premise from which the
Court examined a pension trustee's obligation to arbitrate. In effect,
the Court presumed that the parties do not intend to utilize arbitra-
tion for pension issues raised by a trustee, except to the extent their
agreements specifically call for arbitration of those issues. This pre-
sumption of nonarbitrability is based on the Court's assumption that
trustee/employer disputes do not trigger union/employer confronta-
tion. This assumption, even if sound, is a dubious ground for aban-
doning the labor presumption of arbitrability in order to defeat the
employer's contractual right to arbitrate the interpretation of pension
provisions. As one commentary stated:
[R]easoning that excludes pension disputes from issues
which are presumptively arbitrable simply because disputes be-
tween trustees and employers cannot lead to strikes, lockouts, or
83. 104 S. Ct. at 1851.
84. See, e.g., O'Hare v. General Maume Transport Corp., 740 F.2d 160, 168 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1181 (1985).
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other excesses of economic power is disturbing.
What this reasoning forebodes for the arbitrability of all
pension issues . . . is unclear. At a minimum, the decision
raises serious questions about the viability of pension arbitra-
tion, and perhaps by extension arbitration in general, under
conditions which the Court sees as not potentially contributing
to labor strife.8
This criticism of the Court's decision in Schneider is both cogent and
justified.
IV. SCHNEIDER: ANATOMY OF A DECISION NOT TO DECIDE
A. Judicial Ducking of Issues
The opinion in Schneider narrowed its inquiry by making un-
tenable characterizations of the lower court's holding. The Eighth
Circuit did not consider "only" whether the parties intended to in-
clude trustee/employer pension disputes within the duty to arbitrate
matters of contract interpretation. Nor did the Eighth Circuit merely
''consult . . . the 'national pension policy' to ascertain the parties'
contractual intent." 8 Justice Powell based these characterizations on
a statement made at the close of the Eighth Circuit's ten-page major-
ity opinion. The statement that it would be "quite a different case"
if the parties' agreements required arbitration of questions of con-
tract interpretation before a trustee could sue, was in a three
paragraph postscript to the opinion.8" That postscript merely ac-
knowledged that the court would have to reconcile explicit contrac-
tual intent with national pension policy if the parties "provided in
express words that trustee claims could not come to court before
questions of contract interpretation had been settled by arbitra-
tion."88 The absence of that commitment was determined merely by
quoting provisions from the parties' agreements without any mention
of national pension policy or an analysis of contractual intent based
on that policy.89
Without regard to the terms and intent of the parties' agree-
ments, the Eighth Circuit majority opinion had already made its
dispositive holding on the basis of a "national pension policy" which
requires that "trustees are given a direct right of access of the
85. Gilman & Gilman, supra note 56, at 192.
86. 104 S. Ct. at 1847 n.5.
87. Id. at 1847 (quoting Schneider, 700 F.2d at 442).
88. Schneider, 700 F.2d at 442.
89. Id. at 442-43.
1987]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
courts." 90 That holding included a re-examination of previous deci-
sions in which the court, following the lead of the Seventh Circuit,
held in similar circumstances that under national pension policy a
trustee was required to exhaust mandatory arbitration procedures.
The Eighth Circuit majority decided that the court's previous deci-
sions were not correctly decided and overruled them. 9 Obviously the
court was not reaching back to determine that in similar circum-
stances its previous decisions misconstrued contractual intent. The
court concluded that its previous decisions misconstrued what the na-
tional pension policy mandates.
The majority opinion's closing comments contrast circumstances
where the parties expressly provide for arbitration of trustee/em-
ployer disputes. Those comments merely suggest that, in those
circumstances, the mandates of national pension policy must be bal-
anced against the parties' freedom to contractually establish pension
plans which explicitly provide for arbitrable methods of resolving all
pension disputes arising under their contracts." That balancing was
not necessary in view of the parties' agreements.
The Eighth Circuit's dissenting opinion recognized that the ma-
jority's holding did not depend merely on the parties' intent to limit
arbitration of pension disputes to those raised by signatories to the
agreements. The dissent assumed without qualification that the ma-
jority holding was critically based on the majority's re-examination
and, in the dissent's view, misconstruction of national pension
policy."3 The dissent found particular fault with the majority's rea-
soning that requiring trustee exhaustion of arbitration procedures
would compromise the independence of trustees in violation of that
policy.' 4 Commentary after the Eighth Circuit's decision similarly
construed the majority opinion.9" Furthermore, in the Supreme
Court proceedings, the parties, including the trustees, argued that
the Eighth Circuit's decision was based on a particular construction
of national pension policy. 96
In short, the Supreme Court in Schneider was called upon to
decide which of the lower courts' conflicting views properly defined
90. Id. at 442.
91. Id. at 438-39, 443.
92. Id. at 442.
93. Id. at 443-45.
94. Id. at 444.
95. See Note, Arbitration and Collectively Bargained Benefit Funds: Trustee Collec-
tion Choices after Robbins v. Prosser, 37 ARK. L. REv. 440 (1983).
96. Briefs for each party, Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U.S. 364
(1984).
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the imperatives of national pension policy which bear on provisions
that require arbitration of contractual pension claims. Depending on
those imperatives, the particular terms and intent of the parties'
agreements may or may not be dispositive. If, for example, requiring
trustee exhaustion of arbitration procedures unduly compromises
trustee independence mandated by national pension policy, then it is
immaterial whether the parties impliedly intended that requirement
by operation of the labor presumption that all issues of contract
interpretation are arbitrable, or expressly imposed that exhaustion
requirement in the contract's arbitration provisions. In either in-
stance the requirement would impermissibly compromise trustee in-
dependence. In each instance, therefore, a determination of the im-
peratives of national labor policy is critical.
B. Presumption of Arbitrability: A Lame Duck for Employers
1. The Reasons for the Presumption
Schneider's cursory rejection of the presumption of arbitrability
which normally attaches to all questions of labor contract interpreta-
tion, is equally perplexing. Justice Powell makes the dispositive
assumption that trustee/employer disputes regarding the meaning of
contractual pension provisions cannot breach industrial peace. How-
ever, he makes this assumption by drawing a weak analogy. Justice
Powell thus equates those disputes with controversies between union
and employer trustees who participate in administration of a Taft-
Hartley pension plan, and relies on the Court's statements in NLRB
v. Amax Coal Co. 97 as support. The Court in Amax stated that
disputes between union and employer appointed trustees over admin-
istration of a Taft-Hartley pension plan cannot lead to exercises of
economic pressure. Justice Powell concludes that "the same observa-
tion applies to disputes between the trustee and the employer," and,
in that context, use of economic weapons would "serve little
purpose."98
In Amax, however, the Court stressed that the trust obligation
of the union and employer designated trustees is to participate in
administration of the pension plan in conformity with the bargained
pension agreement. Furthermore, section 302 of Taft-Hartley
imposes compulsory arbitration when the trustees deadlock over ad-
97. 453 U.S. 322 (1981) See supra note 73.
98. 104 S. Ct. at 1849 n.13.
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ministration." Under that scheme, Amax reasoned, union or em-
ployer use of economic weapons to break the deadlock is precluded.
But in other contexts the parties' resort to economic pressure, while
perhaps unlikely, is not necessarily proscribed by statute. Indeed, in
Amax the Court recognized the legitimacy of a union strike to pres-
sure an employer to continue contributing to an established plan -
a nonadministration issue. Union pressure would appear to be
equally legitimate when, as in Schneider, trustees initiate a claim
that the employer is delinquent under the parties' agreement.
Of course, when the agreement includes a mutual bargain to
use grievance arbitration to interpret the agreement's pension provi-
sions, the parties may be constrained under the Steelworkers Trilogy
from the usual economic pressures to resolve the dispute. Allowing
the trustee to bypass an arbitration forum deprives the employer of
that contractual benefit. At the same time, however, it leaves the em-
ployer under the contractual constraint against economic pressure.
Moreover, Justice Powell takes a myopic view of the labor
presumption of arbitrability. The Steelworkers Trilogy rooted the
presumption in the labor statutes' explicit encouragement of negoti-
ating methods of peacefully resolving disputes and adhering to the
method selected in labor agreements.100 However, the right to avoid
the costs of defending a suit in a judicial forum is incidental to select-
ing binding grievance arbitration.0 The avoidance of industrial un-
rest is, therefore, not the exclusive basis for encouraging labor
arbitration.
2. A Companion Presumption in Commercial Arbitration
Under the Federal Arbitration Act
Avoidance of various costs of litigation is historically the stated
basis for both negotiating and enforcing arbitration provisions in
commercial contracts. In a line of cases decided almost contempora-
neously with Schneider, the Supreme Court expanded the policy
basis for enforcing agreements to arbitrate ordinary commercial con-
99. See supra note 25 and accompanying text,
100. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 2-3 (4th ed.
1985).
101. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has recognized
that an employer has an incentive to negotiate arbitration provisions in a labor agreement as a
means of "saving the expenses and aggravation associated with a lawsuit." Gardner-Denver,
415 U.S. at 55. In Schneider, Justice Powell ignores this employer interest and, curiously,
stresses the expense of arbitrating trustee-employer disputes. 104 S. Ct. at 1851.
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tract disputes. Using primarily the Federal Arbitration Act,1"' which
covers contracts involving transactions in interstate commerce or the
maritime industry, the Court held that Congress has established a
national policy favoring arbitration and requiring parties to honor
arbitration agreements. Moreover, the Court held that this policy
constitutes federal substantive law, which is applicable in both fed-
eral and state courts.103 The gist of that policy, the Court empha-
sized, is to place an arbitration agreement "upon the same footing as
other contracts, where it belongs."10 4
Furthermore, the Court's recent decisions applying the Federal
Arbitration Act recognize that the national policy favoring arbitra-
tion consists of interrelated congressional mandates to give full play
to both labor and commercial agreements in arbitrating contractual
disputes.108 That statute is not directly applicable to labor arbitra-
tion in the federal sector. However, "it should not be overlooked as a
guide for the courts in fashioning the body of [federal] law for labor
arbitration. ' "
The Supreme Court has distilled from the Federal Arbitration
Act principles which bear on issues raised when, as in Schneider, a
suit is filed invoking both ERISA and seeking interpretation of pen-
sion provisions in a labor agreement which commits the parties to
arbitrating claims arising under the agreement. In Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,107 the federal
district court refused to order arbitration under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act. The court's refusal was based on an earlier and pending
state court suit where one of the parties was raising the same issue of
arbitrability. The Supreme Court held that the refusal to order arbi-
tration was an abuse of discretion, even though the order would
result in bifurcated proceedings in state and federal courts. The fed-
eral court's failure to order arbitration "frustrated the [Federal Arbi-
tration Act's] policy of rapid and unobstructed enforcement of
102. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-08 (1982).
103. Southland Co. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
104. Id. at 15-16.
105. Recent decisions by the Supreme Court indicate that under various congressional
enactments there are common reasons for negotiating and enforcing labor and commercial
agreements to arbitrate. See Bendixsen, Enforcing the Duty to Arbitrate Claims Arising Under
a Collective Bargaining Agreement Rejected in Bankruptcy: Preserving the Parties' Bargain
and National Labor Policy, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 401, 405-07, 438-42 (1986).
106. F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 100, at 26. See also M. DOMKE, THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:02 (rev. ed. 1984).
107. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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arbitration agreements." ' 08 Bifurcated proceedings occurred "because
the relevant federal law requires piecemeal resolution when neces-
sary to give effect to an arbitration agreement." ' 9
The conclusion reached in Cone was deemed dispositive in
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd."0 There, an investor filed a
federal court suit against Dean Witter alleging violation of federal
securities laws. The investor also sought monetary recovery under
state law for breach of the parties' investment contract, which pro-
vided for arbitration of disputes under the contract. The district
court, affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, denied Dean Witter's request
for an order compelling arbitration of the pendant contract claims.
Arbitration was denied on the ground that those claims were inter-
twined factually and legally with the federal security law claims,
which only the district court could decide. The Supreme Court re-
versed. Citing Cone, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act
"requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendant arbitrable
claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where
the result would be the [possible] inefficient maintenance of separate
proceedings in different forums.""'
The Court distinguished cases barring arbitration, for example,
of security and antitrust violations, since Dean Witter sought arbi-
tration of claims under only the investment contract. Even though
"piecemeal" litigation would result, "we [must] rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate . . . to [protect] . . . the contractual rights of
the parties and their rights under the [Federal] Arbitration Act.""'
The Court rejected the argument that arbitration should be denied
because the arbitrator's findings would have collateral estoppel, or
"preclusive," effect in the court suit on federal securities claims. It
held that the trial court would be free to determine the extent to
which the arbitrator's findings would be given preclusive effect con-
sistent with federal interests. Accordingly, "there is no reason to
require that the district courts decline to compel arbitration, or ma-
nipulate the order of the bifurcated proceedings, simply to avoid an
infringement of federal interests. '113
108. Id. at 23.
109. Id. at 20.
110. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
111. Id. at 1241.
112. Id. at 1242-43.
113. Id. at 1244. The quoted statement from Dean Witter that a prior award should not
have preclusive effect in a subsequent court action is simply irreconcilable with the statement
in Schneider that "the outcome of any subsequent judicial proceeding could be predetermined
by the outcome of arbitration." 104 S. Ct. at 1851.
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The Supreme Court's recent decision in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. may be even more instruc-
tive.11 ' There, the Court held that antitrust claims are arbitrable,
pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, when the claims arise in an
agreement covered by the Act embodying an international commer-
cial transaction. The Court invoked its earlier decision which upheld
the arbitrability of federal securities claims arising in connection
with international commercial transactions.1 1 5 The international set-
ting enabled the Court to avoid a ruling on the legitimacy of the
American Safety doctrine, which precludes arbitration of claims rais-
ing statutory antitrust issues. The lower federal courts have cited
that doctrine in holding that antitrust claims arising from domestic
commercial transactions are of a character inappropriate for enforce-
ment by arbitration."' Nonetheless, the Court questioned some
aspects of that doctrine.1 1 7 It acknowledged that not "all controver-
sies implicating statutory rights are suitable for arbitration." " '
However, when that implication exists, "a party does not forego the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum."" 9 The Court
went on to say that "[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the par-
ties should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an inten-
tion to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights
in issue." ' 0
In Mitsubishi the Supreme Court reiterated a federal standard
which requires that doubts about the arbitrability of claims be re-
solved in favor of arbitration. That standard, the Court indicated,
emanates from the Steelworkers Trilogy of labor arbitration decisions
as well as from the Federal Arbitration Act. 2 ' The Court thus as-
sumed the affinity between national policy regarding enforcement of
promises to arbitrate in commercial agreements and a like policy
pertaining to labor agreements.
The reaction of the lower federal courts to these recent Supreme
Court pronouncements is significant. They have treated them as vir-
114. 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
115. Id. at 3355 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)).
116. 105 S. Ct. at 3355 (citing American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. McQuire & Co.,
319 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968)).
117. 105 S. Ct. at 3357.
118. Id. at 3355.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 3353-54. The Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation of the labor presumption
of arbitrability is unequivocal. See supra note 21.
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tually holding that a presumption of arbitration attaches to disputes
arising under commercial contracts which provide for compulsory ar-
bitration. 2 ' This reaction enhances the anomaly that in Schneider
these pronouncements were ignored in a holding which deprived the
employers of a contractual right to compulsory arbitration of ques-
tions of contract interpretation. Moreover, this was done in a holding
which treated as critical the absence of an express contractual
requirement that the particular dispute be arbitrated - a virtual
presumption of nonarbitrability. The anomaly grows if, as some
have suggested, arbitration of contractual pension issues is a hybrid
form of alternative dispute resolution because it involves both labor
contract and commercial contract oriented issues.' In that event,
Schneider abruptly refused to apply a presumption of arbitrability in
both areas in which the Court has recently reiterated the strength of
that presumption. That refusal, furthermore, ignored the fact that
the interrelated statutory and contractual dispute arose under a stat-
ute (ERISA) in which Congress has embraced compulsory
arbitration.12 4
V. CONCLUSION
The courts are often called upon to reconcile statutory policies
which appear to be in conflict. The judicial function is to resolve the
conflict in a manner which advances each policy without frustrating
another. In Schneider the Supreme Court was confronted with dis-
parate views taken by the lower courts to resolve a clash between
national pension policy and national labor policy. Lower courts
which sustained the assertions of pension plan trustees concluded
that the court's responsibility under ERISA is to protect the statu-
tory and contractual rights of plan beneficiaries. These courts
permitted direct lawsuits against employers for delinquent contribu-
tions owing under collective bargaining agreements, even though ju-
dicial interpretation of disputed terms of such agreements was re-
quired. Other courts sustained the assertions of employers that such
direct lawsuits violated the compulsory arbitration provisions in the
agreements in violation of national labor policy.
122. See, e.g., Finkle & Ross v. A.G. Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
123. Dobranski, supra note 26, at 66 n.4; Murphy, The Impact of ERISA on Arbitra-
tion, 32 ARB. J. 123 (1977).
124. The Taft-Hartley plan deadlock arbitration (see supra note 25 and accompanying
text), and MPPAA withdrawal liability arbitration (see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying
text) are examples.
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The Supreme Court has developed principles for determining
when assertion of a statutory claim warrants direct access to a judi-
cial forum. Those principles address whether such claims should be
decided in court, even though ruling on the merits requires the court
to interpret a labor agreement providing for arbitration of all matters
of contract application and interpretation.125 Thus, the recognized
touchstones for resolving the conflict in Schneider and similar cases
include: 1) whether the statutory right has priority to immediate
court protection because Congress granted an individual rather than
collective right; 2) whether the facts and arguments comprise a fa-
miliar judicial setting or, instead, are industry specific and linked to
law of the shop considerations common to arbitration; and 3)
whether a prior award would be given normal judicial deference if a
viable statutory issue remained for a court to decide.12 Moreover,
with regard to such conflicts under the Federal Arbitration Act, the
Supreme Court specified that the prospect of bifurcated proceedings
does not defeat a contractual right to an arbitral forum. In that con-
text the Court also advanced rather than retreated from the national
policy of encouraging both labor and commercial arbitration. Against
that background, Schneider's tortured and noncommittal holding in
denigration of agreed upon arbitration is difficult to understand.
One feature of that holding has, in particular, become marked
by the Supreme Court's continued unwillingness to plumb past
experience to articulate the imperatives of national pension policy
versus labor policy. Citing possible conflict of interest, the Court in
Schneider saw no substance in the employers' argument that a
union's duty of fair representation will provide an incentive for a
union to initiate meaningful arbitration of trustee/employer contract
disputes. 1 7 The Court has continued to use this reasoning to deni-
grate the arbitral process regarding pension disputes. Thus, the
Court has stated that its holding in Schneider "in large part relied
on the proposition that there was no federal policy favoring trustee
dependence on a union's use of a grievance and arbitration sys-
tem. . . .""a It surely does not follow, however, that there is no
federal policy even worth considering for requiring the trustee to ex-
haust contractually-mandated arbitration procedures for interpreting
contractual pension provisions. All the Court has to do, for example,
125. See supra note 70, discussing Gardner-Denver and other cases.
126. See Fowler, supra note 70, at 181; Surviving ERISA, supra note 25, at 290-92,
314 n.254; Burke v. Latrobe Steel Co., 775 F.2d 88, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1985).
127. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
128. Central States 105 S. Ct. at 2842-43 (1985).
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is examine the merit of lower court opinions which reason that the
exhaustion requirement could be limited to requesting the union to
initiate arbitration of the trustee's contractual claim. "[I1f after the
trustees have requested arbitration the union does not pursue that
remedy, or fails to act in the best interests of the fund beneficiaries,
the trustees are free to seek redress in the courts.
129
It is not suggested here that the above is necessarily the proper
solution. It is suggested, however, that in this and other respects the
Supreme Court in Schneider failed to examine issues both ripe and
calling for resolution. If so, a future resolution seems inevitable, and
may reveal that Schneider precipitately deprived employers of a con-
tractual entitlement to have an arbitrator interpret their pension
agreements13 0
129. 700 F.2d at 444 (Henley, J., dissenting). Accord Trustees of Local 478 Trucking,
721 F.2d at 458-61 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
130. The trend of the lower court decisions seems to be one of giving narrow application
to Schneider. This includes implied skepticism with regard to Justice Powell's observations
concerning the parties' nonuse of economic pressure to resolve pension disputes. See, e.g., Vig-
giano, 750 F.2d at 276; Barrowelough, 752 F.2d at 939; Burke, 775 F.2d at 92.
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